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1. Introduction 
 The main component of the market-oriented reform that has fueled China’s great 
economic growth since 1978 is the corporatization and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). As a result of this reform, SOE managers have gained more 
autonomy and incentives, so SOE restructuring can be regarded as a success (Chen et 
al., 2009). Today, many SOEs are traded as public corporations whose shareholders 
are primarily concerned with preventing managerial self-interest behaviors and 
effectively motivating managers to enhance firm performance (Firth et al., 2006). One 
method for achieving these goals, according to Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
Murphy (1998), is to base CEO pay on performance, a practice supported, albeit 
weakly, by empirical evidence from U.S. firms. In fact, Shirley and Xu (1998) do find 
that Chinese firms often use performance contracts for CEO compensation and that 
such contracts can boost firm performance substantially. 
 One distinct characteristic of China’s listed firms is that the central government is 
the ultimate authority of personnel control in the corporate sector. As Li (1998) points 
out, starting in the early 1980s, the central government of China implemented a 
mandate for almost all bureaucrats at various levels aimed at appointing younger 
officials who were more familiar with capitalist ideas. Hence, in SEOs, top managers 
are often in a selection and evaluation process for bureaucratic promotion. According 
to research on the incentive role of politically controlled personnel systems, the 
likelihood of such political promotion for provincial officials is strongly related to 
their economic performance (Li and Zhou, 2005). Likewise, in SOEs, politically 
appointed CEOs can be promoted to higher bureaucratic ranks if they deliver positive 
economic performance. Thus, the managerial incentives for CEOs in China should 
include not only performance-based compensation but also performance-based 
political promotion. We therefore propose political promotion as an alternative 
incentive mechanism and empirically investigate the incentive role in SOEs of 
politically controlled personnel systems that act as competitive arenas in the political 
job market.  
 Even in the presence of explicit contracts, however, career concerns are important 
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implicit incentives (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Brickley, Coles and Linck, 1999). 
This particularly relevant in China where CEOs of state-owned enterprises often have 
implicit political careers in addition to explicit CEO roles. We therefore conjecture 
that politically nominated CEOs, who have few outside job opportunities, will be 
more concerned about assessment by government officials than by outside managerial 
labor markets; especially given that political promotion up the political career 
hierarchy carries with it higher payment and more power. These latter provide 
managers with strong incentives to increase their probability of promotion and firm 
performance (Kale et al., 2009).  
 This paper makes a significant contribution to our understanding of how, in an 
institutional environment that is weak on effective corporate governance, alternative 
mechanisms based on managerial political promotion may provide China's executives 
with strong managerial incentives and ultimately enhance the performance and growth 
of the state economy. It thus enriches our understanding of the necessary conditions 
for economic growth in China, where SOEs often play a pivotal role in key industries.   
 Besides revealing significantly positive effects of compensation incentives and 
promotion incentives on firm performance, our empirical analysis indicates that the 
positive relation between CEO pay and firm performance weakens when the CEO is 
awarded the promotion incentive. Not only does this finding strongly suggest that the 
promotion incentive substitutes for the compensation incentive when the CEO is 
highly driven by political career concerns, but the positive relationship between these 
two incentive mechanisms and firm performance holds even after we correct for the 
potentially endogenous determination of CEO pay. A further analysis comparing 
SOEs with privately controlled firms (non-SOEs) finds that although compensation 
incentives are effective in both, the positive relationship between promotion 
incentives and firm performance holds only in SOEs. This finding suggests that CEOs 
in SOEs have strong incentives for political promotion, whereas CEOs in privately 
controlled firms focus only on their explicit incentives.     
   Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 describes the incentive structure and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 
 3
presents the data sample and methodology, after which Section 5 outlines the 
empirical results and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Executive compensation 
   Because most extant studies on CEO pay and firm performance are based on the 
agency theory paradigm, they conclude that CEO pay is based on a firm’s past and 
current economic performance. That is, because of the separation of ownership and 
management, CEOs have the rights of final decision making and therefore enjoy and 
take advantage of the information asymmetries within firms to pursue their personal 
objectives. As a result, they are likely to expropriate shareholder wealth. Hence, 
academics argue, firms implement effective managerial compensation schemes to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders. Indeed, this assumption is supported 
by empirical evidence from developed countries (Conyon, 1997; Core et al., 1999; 
Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Basu et al., 2007) and more recently from developing 
countries (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007; Angelo et al., 2007), which 
is complemented by extensive study on pay-performance sensitivity and elasticity 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Firth et al., 2006; Kato et al., 2007). 
   Such studies, however, by focus only on the causality from firm performance to 
CEO pay, ignore the motivational effects of CEO pay on firms’ future performance. 
This omission raises questions about the applicability of managerial compensation in 
China and implies a need for additional theory to explain the relationship between 
managerial compensation and firm performance. A viable alternative to agency theory 
for the case of China is the institutional theory first proposed by Bruce et al. (2005), 
whch allows for the state’s controlling influence over listed firms (Buck et al., 2008). 
From this perspective, CEO pay should be regarded not only as a reward for firm 
performance but also as a motivation for CEOs to increase shareholder wealth (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990). Accordingly, because CEOs stand at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy and have the right of final decision making, research on China should take 
into account the motivational effects from CEO pay to firm performance in China’s 
unique institutional environment.  
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Some extant studies have indeed addressed this aspect. For example, Buck et al. 
(2008), using the average top three executive’s total compensation to proxy for top 
executive pay, find not only that such pay is positively and significantly related to 
firm performance in the 2000–2003 period but that the motivational effects of CEO 
pay are feasible and applicable to China. Indeed, the fact that the managerial 
compensation reported by listed firms consists of both basic salary and bonuses, 
excluding the value of stock options and restricted stocks, provides an excellent 
environment in which to study the responsiveness of CEO pay to firm performance, 
especially stock price. Indeed, this latter is particularly relevant given that the stock 
option formula (Black-Scholes) links CEO pay directly to stock price and 
compensation packages without long-term incentives are now highly attractive in 
China (Buck et al., 2008). An alternative view of agency theory’s primary assumption 
of great divergence between the interests of managers and shareholders is offered by 
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1989, 1991), which proposes that 
managers, rather than being motivated by individual goals, act as stewards whose 
motives are aligned with the shareholders.  
 
2.2 Political connection and motivation 
   The politically connected firm—usually very large and operating in regulated 
industries—is a global phenomenon. Such firms not only benefit from the protection 
of the central government but have easy access to preferential treatment like bank 
loans and raw materials, lighter taxation, and relaxed regulations (Faccio, 2006; 
Faccio et al., 2006). Most particularly, according to Faccio’s (2006) analysis of data 
from 20,202 publicly traded firms in 47 countries, politically connected firms are 
common in countries perceived as highly corrupt, in countries that impose restrictions 
on citizen foreign investment, and in more transparent systems. However, although 
this political connection can add company value, it also means political intervention. 
Hence, firms are also driven to achieve other nonprofitable government objectives, 
such as maintaining employment levels and providing excessive job opportunities 
(Faccio et al., 2006).  
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According to cross-country data, however, politically connected firms perform 
worse than non-politically connected firms, meaning that the cost of political 
connection offsets the benefits it generates (Boubakri et al., 2008). Boubakri et al. 
(2008) therefore investigate the extent of political connections in newly privatized 
firms around the world using a 1980–2002 sample of 245 such firms headquartered in 
27 developing countries and 14 developed countries. However, although they do show 
that politically connected privatized firms underperform their nonconnected 
counterparts, like the other studies mentioned, they fail to provide direct evidence of 
how political connections affect firm performance.  
The fact that the political connection phenomenon is more widespread in China 
than elsewhere is not the only reason this case offers an appropriate setting for study. 
China is also unique in that the state is usually the controlling shareholder of listed 
firms. Moreover, despite having launched the privatization of SOEs and listed them 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the central government retains 
control over personnel, which results directly in listed firms’ political connections. At 
the same time, a growing body of literature on the effects of political connections in 
China’s listed firms suggests that political intervention results in low operating 
efficiency because these firms must still meet government objectives (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994; Shleifer, 1998; Sun and Tong, 2003; Wei et al., 2005; Fan et al., 2007). 
Other evidence suggests that politically connected firms perform worse than 
non-politically connected firms (Fan et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008) and that firms are 
likely to hire a CEO with political experience when confronted with economic distress 
or market failures (Li et al., 2006, 2008).  
Fan et al. (2007) focus their research specifically on China’s newly partially 
privatized firms. Based on data from 1993 to 2001, they not only find that politically 
connected CEOs underperform non-politically connected CEOs but document a 
negative effect of politically connected CEOs on firm performance measured by a 
three-year post-IPO stock return. Apparently, during the corporatization process, the 
market can distinguish firms with and without politically connected CEOs. Their 
results also reveal that despite largely granting operating decision rights to SOE 
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managers, the government retains ultimate decision rights over mergers and 
acquisitions, as well as over the disposal of shares and assets of these listed firms and 
the appointment of their CEOs. 
In contrast, Li et al.’s (2008) study of the private enterprises that have evolved in 
China since 1978 documents a positive effect of politically connected CEOs on firm 
performance measured by ROA and ROE. They therefore argue that in China, where 
the weak institutional environment imposes higher costs on private enterprises and 
damages their performance, political connection and status can reduce these costs and 
improve firm performance. Therefore, to differentiate the political connection 
elements from the human capital elements, they add more variables into the 
regression to test whether the party membership dummy variable remains positive and 
significant. Their empirical results show that in privately owned enterprises, 
politically connected CEOs do indeed have a positive effect on firm performance and 
the enhancement of firm profitability.  
 Under this politically controlled personnel system, the Chinese central 
government is the ultimate authority over the selection, appointment, and dismissal of 
top executives in SOEs. Hence, politically appointed CEOs and top executives within 
this sector must also consider their political careers. In this context, therefore, the 
potential for political promotion motivates CEOs to work hard (Hong, 2009), and the 
need to improve the enterprises’ economic performance motivates government to set 
up the political career concerns. Indeed, Qian and Xu (1993) find a significant 
positive correlation between a change in economic performance and a change in the 
region’s political position. This finding is echoed by Li and Zhou’s (2005) recent 
identification (based on provincial level data for China between 1979 and 1995) of a 
positive relationship between the likelihood of provincial leader promotion and their 
regional economic performance. All such evidence illustrates the effects of the 
politically controlled personnel system and political career motivations on positive 
performance.  
The findings for regional officials also apply at the firm level. In particular, 
Groves et al. (1995) find that during the 1980s, managers in China’s SOEs tend to be 
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promoted (demoted) following good (poor) firm performance. In contrast, Li et al.’s 
(2006) study of privately controlled listed firms in China relates entrepreneurs’ 
political participation to market underdevelopment, showing particularly that the 
establishment of political connection in privately controlled firms can be a response to 
market failure in the transition economy. Similar evidence is provided by Hu and 
Leung (2008), whose analysis of 2001–2005 data for 696 listed SOEs finds a 
significantly positive association between the appointment of political executives and 
poor performance and financial distress. They also document a significant increase in 
firm performance following the appointment of political executives, a performance 
improvement not observed in firms that appoint managers without political 
background and experience.  
To date, however, despite evidence that good firm performance leads to CEO 
promotion, no empirical research has addressed the incentive effect of promotion in 
the Chinese context. Therefore, to shed light on this issue, this paper provides 
evidence on the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms.  
 
3. Institutional background and hypotheses 
3.1 Managerial compensation in China’s listed firms 
Before the introduction of China’s economic reforms, SOE managers were only 
agents and representatives of the central government. More specifically, they were 
bureaucrats appointed directly by the central personnel department. During that period, 
all profits realized by SOEs were to be repatriated to the central government, leaving 
no incentives for managers. Rather, these were paid according to the highly structured 
civil service pay scale, whose wage variations reflect only the differences in region, 
industry, and ranking.  
In the early stage of reform, CEO pay was constrained based on the equality or 
near equality of the pay differential between top executives and workers (Firth et al., 
2006). In 1985, however, the Ministry of Labor suggested that CEO pay be linked to 
firm economic performance to provide profit-oriented incentives (Yueh, 2004). Since 
privatization in the early 1990s, the compensation decision has been the responsibility 
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of company boards, who have gradually applied the performance-based pay systems 
that research suggests are efficient (Groves et al., 1995; Mengistae and Xu, 2004). 
 
3.2 Personnel control systems and political promotion in China 
Under the corporatization and privatization of SOEs in China, most 
decision-making rights have shifted from the state to the firm level. However, 
although the state has decentralized authority in most aspects, as previously 
mentioned, it retains control over personnel and has ultimate authority over the 
selection, appointment, and dismissal of top SOE executives. In SOEs affiliated with 
the central government, this personnel decision is in the hands of the State Asset 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), but in other SOEs, it is 
decentralized to local SASACs. The state is also likely to control personnel decision 
in other enterprises whose involvement with the state gives them sufficient motivation 
to be politically connected (Li et al., 2006).  
Because of this control by the state and/or state-related agents, CEOs in the 
Chinese corporate sector are often politically appointed. Because such politically 
appointed CEOs are most concerned about their human capital assessment by the 
internal political labor market, the government controlled personnel system—itself 
motivated by government pursuance of better firm economic performance—uses 
promotion (demotion) of CEOs based on good (poor) firm performance as a 
managerial incentive (Groves et al., 1995). We thus formulate the following two 
hypotheses: 
H1: CEO pay has positive effects on firm performance. 
H2: Political promotion has positive effects on firm performance. 
We further conjecture that in China, where managerial incentives are often weak 
because institutions lack efficient corporate governance and job market for CEOs is 
less developed, implicit managerial political career concerns can substitute for weak 
monetary incentives of CEO pay: 
H3: The CEO pay effect is weaker when CEOs have more political career 
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concerns.  
 
4. Sample and methodology 
4.1 Data 
We first collect political connection and promotion information manually by 
searching the listed firm’s annual reports and comparing accounting and corporate 
governance data for all listed firms in China from 2002 to 2007. Consistent with prior 
studies, we delete ST and PT2 firms from our population because including them will 
bias our results. To address the specially regulated industry consideration, we also 
exclude financial industry firms with unique accounting standards. Finally, we 
exclude observations with missing information. Our final sample consists of 1,219 
listed firms and 3,160 firm-year observations. All study data are taken from the 
Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) and SinoFin databases, 
which are also used in prior studies on China (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 
2006).  
 
4.2 Methodology 
   To test our hypotheses, we apply the following regression:  
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
9 10
*
                         
                         
it it it it it
it it it it it
it it it
Performance Pay Promotion Pay Promotion
Size Board Pond Lev Invest
Age Tenure Industry Year
α α α α
α α α α α
α α ε
= + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
           (1) 
where Performance and Size represent firm performance and firm size, respectively; 
Board is the board size, and Pond is the proportion of independent directors. Lev 
represents the firm’s leverage level and Invest, its future investment opportunities. 
Promotion is a dummy variable coded 1 if CEO turnover resulted from promotion, 
and Political is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO has a political background.  
 
4.3 Variable definitions 
Political promotion. We collect information on the CEOs’ political connections 
manually from listed firm’s annual reports from 2002 to 2007. For each firm in each 
                                                        
2 ST and PT stand for special treatment and particular transfer. The stock exchanges flag a listed firm ST 
when irregularities appear in its financial or accounting statement or PT when it shows consecutive 
negative earnings for 3 years.     
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year, we compile a CEO profile that includes age, gender, education, experience, and 
professional background. Based on this profile, we trace CEOs’ political connections 
by examining whether they are current or former officers of either the central 
government, the local government, or the military, and whether they are affiliated with 
government cadres at various levels or members of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), or the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP). We then trace the turnover of politically connected 
CEOs using the promotion or demotion information from their profiles. Our proxy for 
Promotion is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the politically connected CEO is 
promoted and 0 otherwise.  
Managerial compensation. Since 1998, China’s listed firms have been disclosing 
the information on managerial compensation in their annual reports. Although 
long-term incentives like stock options and restricted stocks have been exercised since 
2006, these data are reported separately, so an executive’s total compensation 
comprises basic salary, bonus, and other cash compensation. We thus define the proxy 
for CEO pay as the log of this total CEO compensation. 
Firm performance. Our primary measures of firm performance in the regressions 
are return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), defined as the ratio of net 
income to the book value of total assets and the ratio of net income to sales, 
respectively. Consistent with the literature, we also perform a robustness analysis 
using two additional measures of firm performance, annual stock monthly return 
(RET) and Tobin’s Q (Q) measured as the ratio of the sum of the market value of 
equity and the book value of debt to total assets. 
Table 1 lists the definitions of all variables, including the control variables, those 
whose potential effects on firm performance are empirically documented in prior 
studies, especially those on China (Davies et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009). 
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Table 1. Variables and Definitions 
Variable  Definition  
Panel A: Managerial compensation 
CEO compensation (CPAY) Log of total cash compensation for CEO 
Panel B: Firm performance 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income/total assets 
Stock return (RET) Annual stock monthly return 
Tobin’s Q Market value/replacement value a 
Return on sales (ROS) Net income/sales 
Panel C: CEO characteristics 
CEO age (Age) Log of the age of the CEO   
CEO tenure (Tenure) Log of the number of years as the firm’s CEO  
CEO duality (Duality) Equals 1 if CEO also chairs the board 
New CEO (New) Equals 1 for first year as CEO 
Retiring CEO (Retire) Equals 1 if CEO’s age is more than 62 
Inside CEO (Insider) Equals 1 if CEO is promoted from inside 
Number of employees (NTop) Log of the number of total employees  
Panel D: Firm characteristics and corporate governance 
Firm size (Size) Log of total assets 
Board size (Board) Log of the number of directors on the board 
% of independent directors (Pond) Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Leverage (Lev) Total debts/total assets in book value 
Investment opportunity (Invest) Total assets growth ratio 
Largest shareholder (Largest) Percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder 
Managerial ownership (Mowner) Percentage of shares owned by the CEO 
aMarket value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt; 
replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets. 
 
4.4 Sample statistics 
   Table 2 lists the statistics on all study variables for the total 2002–2007 sample. 
Panels A and B detail CEO compensation and measures of firm performance, panel C 
presents summary statistics for measures of CEO and firm characteristics and 
corporate governance, and panel D gives detailed information on the frequency of 
CEO political promotion.  
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for All Variables 
Variable  Mean  Median  Lower quartile Higher quartile 
Panel A: Executive compensation 
CEO pay 299,472 221,500 118,590 370,000 
Panel B: Firm performance 
ROA (%) 2.26 2.64 0.84 5.12 
RET (%) 39.69 -3.96 -24.35 68.21 
Tobin’s Q 1.16 0.96 0.81 1.24 
ROS (%) -0.043 0.039 1.49 9.82 
Panel C: CEO characteristics, firm characteristics, and corporate governance 
CEO age 45.65 45 41 50 
CEO tenure 2.55 2 1 3.75 
Firm size (million) 3,940 1,770 1,010 3,390 
Leverage (%) 49.71 50.25 36.92 62.10 
Investment (%) 15.37 8.93 -0.12 21.73 
Board size 9.76 9 9 11 
Independent directors 3.13 3 3 4 
Largest ownership (%) 40.65 39.03 27.27 54.20 
Panel D: Frequency of political promotion by year 
2002 a 3    
2003 a 1     
2004 a 6     
2005 105    
2006 86    
2007 71    
Note: The statistics represent the averages of the 6 years from 2002 to 2007. All value variables are in 
China’s currency, the RMB.  
a Because information is missing from the observations, the numbers for promotional frequency 
between 2002 and 2004 are small. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Regression results from the OLS estimation 
We report our findings on the incentive effects of CEO pay and political 
promotion on firm performance in Table 3. The first column reports the results when 
ROA is used as the firm performance measure; the second column, those when ROA 
is replaced with ROS. Across these two specifications, the coefficients on both CEO 
pay and CEO political promotion are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. These estimated results provide primary evidence in support of the hypotheses 
that CEO compensation and promotion positively affect firm performance.  
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Table 3.  Regression of Incentive Effects on Firm Performance 
OLS regression on firm performance 
Dependent variable ROA ROS 
Constant -0.395***(-9.42) -0.748***(-9.01) 
Pay 0.015***(10.15) 0.029***(9.86) 
Promotion 0.171**(2.56) 0.522***(3.97) 
Pay*Promotion -0.120**(-2.15) -0.039***(-3.63) 
Size 0.169***(11.91) 0.029***(9.93) 
Lev -0.207***(-43.96) -0.337***(-24.44) 
Invest 0.045***(14.62) 0.081***(13.08) 
Largest 0.021**(2.69) 0.032**(2.06) 
Board 0.002(0.38) -0.003(-0.35) 
Pond 0.026(1.40) 0.001(0.00) 
Age -0.017*(-1.89) -0.011(-0.16) 
Tenure 0.008***(5.29) 0.009***(3.08) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.4804 0.2709 
Obs 3160 3160 
Note: Firm performance, measured by either ROA or ROS, is the dependent variable. Pay = CEO pay, 
defined as the log of CEO total compensation; Size = the log of total firm assets, Lev = the ratio of total 
debts to total assets; Invest = the firm’s future investment opportunity, defined as the growth rate of 
firm total assets; Largest = the proportion of shares held by the largest shareholder; Board = the log of 
the total number of directors on the board; Pond = the percentage of independent directors; Age= the 
log of CEO age, and Tenure = the log of years that the CEO has been CEO of the firm. Promotion is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is promoted and 0 otherwise. T-statistics, computed using the 
White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 3 also reveals some interesting results for the interaction term, 
Pay*Promotion, whose coefficients are negatively related to firm performance in all 
specifications. This finding clearly indicates that political promotion can serve as a 
substitute for a CEO pay scheme. Most particularly, once CEOs are promoted, the 
managerial compensation scheme incentives can be less efficient, which provides 
some evidence that CEO pay scheme incentives are indeed weaker when CEOs are 
driven by political career concerns. Not surprisingly, given that explicit incentives 
(salary, bonus, and other cash compensation) are quite low in China (Firth et al., 
2006), our results also show that implicit incentives play a more important role than 
explicit ones in motivating CEOs. One implication of this result is that, consistent 
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with Gibbons and Murphy’s (2002) finding that career concerns are important implicit 
incentives, in the context of China, managerial career concerns either substitute for or 
at least fail to dominate CEO monetary incentives.  
In line with Chen et al. (2009), among the control variables, firm size and 
investment opportunity are positively related to firm performance. Specifically, the 
coefficient on Largest is positive and significant, while that on Lev is negative and 
significant in both regressions. The signs of the coefficients for the control variables 
are broadly similar to those reported in the literature. In contrast, board characteristics 
show no significant impact on firm performance, reflecting China’s relatively weak 
corporate governance system (Buck et al., 2008). CEO tenure, however, is positively 
and significantly related to firm performance, which suggests that incumbent CEOs 
are willing to deliver good firm performance.  
  Table 4 lists the results after the total sample is divided into two subsamples,  
SOEs and privately controlled firms (non-SOEs), with firm performance measured by 
either ROA or ROS as the dependent variable. The coefficient on CEO pay is positive 
and significant across both groups, indicating that an effective pay scheme has been 
exercised extensively. The results also show that political promotion incentives are 
positive and significant only in SOEs.  
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Table 4.  Regression of Incentive Effects of Firm Performance on the Subsamples 
Panel A: OLS regression on SOEs  
Dependent variable ROA ROS 
Constant -0.432***(-9.88) -0.803***(-8.25) 
Pay 0.018***(11.61) 0.032***(9.55) 
Promotion 0.186***(2.88) 0.545***(3.81) 
Pay*Promotion -0.013**(-2.51) -0.042***(-3.56) 
Size 0.142***(9.94) 0.029***(9.08) 
Lev -0.189***(-28.47) -0.321***(-20.25) 
Invest 0.041***(13.32) 0.077***(11.04) 
Largest 0.027***(3.46) 0.047***(2.69) 
Board 0.004(0.69) 0.007(0.53) 
Pond 0.013(0.71) -0.028(-0.71) 
Age -0.002(-0.20) -0.015(-0.72) 
Tenure 0.006***(3.90) 0.009***(2.77) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.4086 0.2818 
Obs 2242 2242 
Panel B: OLS regression on privately controlled firms  
Constant -0.443***(-4.19) -0.735***(-3.99) 
Pay 0.011***(2.97) 0.022***(3.60) 
Promotion 0.149(0.83) 0.456(1.49) 
Pay*Promotion -0.009(-0.64) -0.032(-1.27) 
Size 0.024***(6.26) 0.029***(4.27) 
Lev -0.213***(-27.69) -0.37***(-13.33) 
Invest 0.049***(6.56) 0.085***(6.64) 
Largest 0.031(1.34) 0.026(0.68) 
Board 0.007(0.45) -0.011(-0.43) 
Pond 0.053(1.15) 0.067(0.84) 
Age -0.031(-1.55) 0.014(0.41) 
Tenure 0.012***(3.29) 0.009(1.53) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.5420 0.2581 
Obs 918 918 
Note: All variables are defined as in Table 3. T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
5.2 Endogeneity 
   Much cross-country evidence has been offered to suggest that firm performance 
determines managerial compensation and is the most effective mechanism for 
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aligning the interests of management and shareholders (Murphy, 1999; Core et al., 
1999; Conyon, 1997; Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2007). In this sense, we 
consider both firm performance and CEO pay to be endogenous. Therefore, to 
re-estimate the first regression, we apply a two-stage least square (2SLS) technique 
that allows selection of the instrumental variables. Based on Kale et al. (2009), we 
include the median value of the CEO pay for firms in the same two-digit CSRC 
(China Securities Regulatory Commission) code. The results are given in Table 5. 
Table 5.  Regression of Incentive Effects on Firm Performance: 2SLS Estimation 
2SLS estimation of incentive effects on firm performance 
Dependent variable ROA ROS 
Constant -3.842***(-7.82) -0.704***(-7.23) 
Pay 0.195***(7.50) 0.029***(5.65) 
Promotion 0.246**(2.85) 0.497***(2.93) 
Pay*Promotion -0.187***(-2.60) -0.038***(-2.73) 
Size 0.128***(7.32) 0.022***(6.21) 
Lev -0.180***(-23.48) -0.318***(-19.96) 
Invest 0.332***(10.22) 0.061***(9.46) 
Largest 0.181*(1.91) 0.056***(2.98) 
Board 0.067(1.02) 0.001(0.50) 
Pond 0.074(0.37) 0.022(0.55) 
Age -0.117(-1.13) 0.008(0.43) 
Tenure 0.051***(2.99) 0.007**(2.13) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.3622 0.2857 
Obs 3160 3160 
Note: All variables are defined as in Table 3. T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) 
heteroscedasticity robust standard error, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Once endogeneity is taken into account, the coefficient on Pay is positively related to 
both ROA and ROS, with estimates statistically significant at the 1% level. However, 
although the coefficient on Promotion is positive and significant in both regressions, 
the interaction term between CEO pay and promotion has a negative and significant 
effect on firm performance. Again, these results support our hypotheses that incentive 
contracts for CEOs have positive effects on firm performance. Therefore, the 2SLS 
analysis offers significant support for the positive relationship between explicit and 
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implicit incentives and firm performance. For the other control variables, the results 
shown in Table 5 are consistent with those in Table 3, which again indicates the 
determinants of firm performance in China. 
 
5.3 Additional tests 
   We repeat our analysis by re-estimating the first regression using two alternative 
measures of firm performance employed in previous studies: stock return (RET) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q). This further analysis, whose results are reported in Table 6, focuses 
primarily on incentive variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, CEO pay in 
particular is positively and significantly related to firm performance in both 
specifications. Likewise, the coefficients of the promotional variables, although 
insignificant, are positive. Among the control variables, the board characteristics are 
significantly related to firm stock market performance and firm value, and the 
coefficients of the other variables are broadly similar to those reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 6.  Regression of Incentive Effects on Firm Performance: Additional Analysis 
OLS regression on firm performance 
Dependent variable RET Q 
Constant -2.56***(-3.53) 3.38***(6.53) 
Pay 0.18***(6.91) 0.18***(9.71) 
Promotion 0.45(0.39) 0.27(0.32) 
Pay*Promotion -0.25(-0.25) -0.02(-0.23) 
Size 0.07***(2.98) -0.18***(-10.26) 
Lev -0.04(-0.46) 0.49***(8.56) 
Invest 0.69***(13.09) 0.17***(4.37) 
Largest -0.85***(-6.22) -0.77***(-7.83) 
Board -0.17*(-1.65) -0.14*(-1.90) 
Pond 0.93***(2.96) 0.68***(3.04) 
Age -0.03(-0.16) -0.09(-0.85) 
Tenure 0.02(0.65) 0.03*(1.64) 
Industry Included Included 
Year Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.1064 0.1165 
Obs 3160 3160 
Note: Firm performance measured by RET and Q is the dependent variable. All other variables are 
defined as in Table 3. T-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust 
standard error, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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6. Conclusions 
In China, because the government retains control over the choice, appointment, 
and dismissal of top executives in state-related enterprises, CEOs face a dual system 
of outside managerial labor market and internal political labor market. However, the 
political nature of the latter market provides them with an informal incentive 
mechanism whose impact on CEO efficiency this analysis attempts to determine. We 
also examine whether politically motivated incentives can substitute for formal 
incentives like CEO compensation. In addition, we test whether, as most extant 
literature suggests, political connections, particularly in partially privatized firms, 
have a negative impact on firm performance (Fan et al., 2007; Boubakri et al., 2008). 
As these earlier analyses ignore the political job market outside government 
controlled institutions, our paper fills a void in the understanding of China’s 
tremendous success in state-related sectors despite weak incentives and poor 
governance.  
Specifically, we find that CEO’s political incentives for promotion have a positive 
effect on firm performance. More important, we find that promotion-based incentives 
substitute for compensation-based incentives. For example, compensation-based 
incentives are less effective when the incumbent CEO is likely to be promoted. 
Overall, our analysis indicates that both formal (pay scheme) and informal (political 
promotion) incentives are effective, the latter because they provide a competitive 
arena for politically appointed CEOs with limited outside options in formal 
managerial job markets. We also report the new empirical finding that CEO’s political 
career concerns not only provide strong incentives but indirectly align CEOs’ interests 
with those of shareholders. Thus, the competitive political arena acts as an informal 
incentive mechanism for CEOs, one that mitigates the weak corporate governance in 
China. Overall, the evidence suggests that state control or political connection is not 
necessarily inconsistent with poor economic incentives.    
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